This paper analyzes the impart of income distribution on growth when investment in human camtal is ttewaw (rfgnwth Mid individuab vote ov«a-the «tegree of redistribution m the econmny. m model has three main features. First, veiy different pattems of income distnbution are conducive to hi^ growth at (MFerent levds of per capita inconw. Second, grow* is aswciated wth M exten^5ien*y investomt in human cajntal by om gro^ increases the productivity rf oth« groups, thiB pMBDtially enabling than to invest in human a^ntal. Tliinl, the imtial pattem of income distribution and the resulting political equiliWum are crucial in *=^'^"8 «J«^ the trananission rfthis extemaKty is promoted, in which case growth is wihanced, or prevented, m w4kk^ CS8C ^xywth is ^cnipod.
INTRODUCTION
In the voluminous Uterature on income distribution and growth, two basic frameworks can be identified. A tradition going back at least to KaWor (1956) emphasizes Ae ausal effect of income distribution on capital accumulation and therefore on growth. Tte develOTmcnt economic literature that flourished in the 196O's and 197O's foUowing the senmial of Kuznets (1955) concmtrated mainly on the opposite causal link, from grewtii to oK distribution. u-«;e Bofli mechanisms are at work in the model of this paper. However, the focus here uj not on capital accumulation, but on the effects of redistribution on investment m human capitaL SpedficaUy. thk paper starts from the observation that income distnbution is not a laven, boi it can be modified to some extent in an economy where the tax system re^butes inccMne. By affecting the post-tax income of the various mcwne groups, redistributicHi ^tofflines which groups wiU be able to invest in human capital and^wtadi groups wiB remain unskilled. In tum, this affects growth and how income distnbution evcd^ over daae. L • •*• i _«M..^ ^r Whcai pofeences are a^regated through a votmg process, the uutal pattem of mcome <totribirtion ?lays a crudal r<de in the evolution of the economy because it determmes the degms of i«a»trihBti«i that prevails in the poUdod equffibnum. ^J^ft a h th ddi otCT k poor retotive to the avcĥ e degms of i«a»trihBti«i th p p g it kirtuitive ttat when the dedsive votCT k poor retotive to the ^r Svdy low tax price of redistribution; flius, as shown by Romer (1975) , Roberts (1977) aad Mdtzer and Richard (1981) , in a voting model ioequafity (i.e., a poor median voter relative to the average voter) tends to be positivdy associated with the level ot
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REVffiW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES taxation and redistribution. In the model of this paper, this simf^ intuition can generate some interacting dynamics.
The essence of the model is very simpte. IndivMuals can belong to one of three different income groa|». Growth and diangra in pre-tax income distribittion are the effect of investimnt in ediKation. The latter benefits the in\^tor directly, and aU tl^ oth^ a^nts indirectly through a production externality. As in Galor and Zeira (1993) , in the absence of perfect capital markets those indiv&iuals whose pcst-tax income is bdow the cost of acquiring education will be unable to invest in human capital, and the next period will earn the same pre-tax income. By contrast, those who can afford the expenditure needed to obtain edircation will have a higher inccmie. ' This simple structure has a first in^mrtant implication: economies with different per capita incomes have very different patterns of income distribution that are most favourable to growth. In a very poor economy total resources may be so scarce that at most the upper dass can invest. Thus, in this case only a very unequal income distribution that concentrates resources in the upper class may be consistent with growth. Aitema.'dvely, given the share of the upper class in total pre-tax inconw, the median voter should not have too large an incentive to set a very progressive tax rate and expropriate the vppar class. This requires that tte middfe class should not be too distant from the upper cl^.
TIK configuration that maximizes iaocaae growth in a rich economy is exactly the opposite (with soms qualifications spelkd out in the formaJ analysis of the model). Here, redistribution m^t matter only for the inv^tm«it of the Umer class. A {necondition is that the middle and the lower class should not be too far apart. Otherwise, it will be too costly for the median voter to redistribute the resources the lower dass needs to invest.
These bask ideas of the paper can be formalized in a sinq>le two-period model. A non-overlapping generations extension of the two-period model develops more fully the imidications of the strong jath-dependence embedded in the framework sketched above. Sped&alty, it formalize a conc^t of growtii as a "trickk down" proc^ by which inv^tment by one dass increase the ftiture inonne of all other dasses as weU, thus enabling an inoi^sing number of da^es to inv^ in ediumtion over tiwe. The basic mesage is that in the at^sice of a central {daniKr the trananisaon ctf" this pcMotive extonaiity can stc^ if it is too costly to the median voter to bring ttem about. For instaiM%, conadter an economy that has grown up to the stage where the middle da^ has invested in edna^on. Now the lowra* da^ will invest in edisation if the median voto* has an incentive to ^act eno^t redistribution. However, if the low iiKxmM dass is mtK p ttem the midifle dass, tixe median vot» does not have sac^ an iisxntive aiul growth stiop. Thus, tl» political outcome gradated t^ tte initkl pa^nn (^inccmie dstrilratiim is determining wtetter the "tridde dcnm" i»:oc<»s of growth will be stof^id before has readnd the hi^liest p(»sU)te stea#-state v^^ae afl da^es have imn»ted m ediKation.
Hiis framework am also fM-ovide a po^bte exfdanaticm of the famcms iBverted-U relati<Mi between levds of income and measures of inequality in cross-section regressions; and of tlw fact that the sanK rdation is more dlfiEknilt to observe in time-foies. It was seen above that a very egalitarian poor economy will not be abk to start the growth process. By contrast, an econcnny with a very imequid income distribution is in the best position to adiwve a hi^ initial rate of growth. Howevor, once the econiHny reaches a higher ievd o( pa capita income, the voy same iaomie dstributicn {Mttem that fuelled the initial sfHfft of growth will hamper fiurther growth. TTius, a vray unequal society will â t an intermediate level of income, because the extreme «»ncentration of rraources in the hands of iht upper dass inrev^its the lower class and possiUy even the middte dais from r^iching a post-tax income that allows investmmt in education. In a more ^ilitarian sockty all da^es will eventually invest in ^ucation, so that inequality will decrease as per caiHta income readies its Mghest level. In a cross-section, this will generate an inverted-U curw, even though only a subset of all countries will present an inverted-U pattCTn in tin» series.
The role of inconK ctistribution in endogenizing the levd of taxation and growth has been the subject of some recent research. The common etement to Alesina and Rodrik (1991), Bertola (1991) and Persson and Tabellini (1991) is that a higher tax rate reduces the private after-tax marginal product of capital and therefore acts as a disincentive to investment and growth. In tum, income inequality and the tax rate resulting from the voting process are positively related through a dynamic extension of the standard median voter result; the reason is that, as in my model, a relatively poor median voter faces a lower tax price ofthe productive public good (Alesina and Rodrik) or ofthe rwiistributive subsidy (Bertola, Persson and Tabellini). A similar mechanism operates in Saint-Paul and Verdier (1991) , except that now a higher tax rate might have beneficial effects by niaking possible a larger expenditure on public education and therefore more accumulation of human capital. The interaction of these two opposite effects generates a hump-shaped relation between inequality and growth.T he rest of tte paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic twoperiod model. Section 3 analyzes the existence of a non-cycling majority and proves that the median voter is the dedsive voter even if prefwences are not single-peaked. Section 4 dmracterizes the poMtical equilibrium and studies its effects on growth depending on the initial income distribution and on the level of income. After sketching the infinite-horizon, non-overlai^ing generations model. Section 5 illustrates why it might be relevant in discussing the issiKS outlined in this introduction. Section 6 discusses the rok of some crucial assumptions and draws some conclusions. Since the formal treatment of the model is rattier notation-intensive and in order not to hamper the intuition behind the results, all the proofs appear in the appendices.
THE MODEL
Tlwre are two periods, 1 aiui 2 and three groups of agents. A, m and / charactOTzed by difbient earning aWlities, i.e. diffident pre-tax incomes. Let nj be the eiuning aWHty of an afmt bdkHi^mg to pre-tax iisome cbss i in period t, with i-h, m or /. In ev«y period, a proportion /?' of agents bdbngs to group L in period 1, ^«-tax inconus are char^rterized by tbe following ineqiraUtira: Ogn'i^fiT^B?. Finally, let Aj Tepreseat the mean of tbe dstribution of pie-tax ii»x»iies in period y. The distribution of pre-tax incomes satit wo conditions: 
REVIEW OF ECX>MOMIC STUDIES
By fnwentiag a angle ckas frran having mme than half tihe i^ents of tbe econcMBy, assm&i^aD (i) is a Kcessary cc«Kliti(m for tte aasbaace of non-trivial n^orities. In addition, assunq>tioa (i) anj^s that Hxt laedian voter is in the mkltte dass. A^uinption (ii) oisuies that the n^dian is initiaUy bdow ihs mean.Î n period 1, agents can inv^t a certain amount in educatitm. As a noroaiization, let Ms amount be equal to 1. TIK onfy choice is hetweeaa in\^^g in education the amount 1, and not inwsting. Investment in education by an agent ias a p(»ntive externality cm the second period {H-oductivity of the other agents. Let ft be the proportion of a^nts ti&t invested in edwation in period 1. Thus, ft can take tte vakta 0, ^, /»*+/»", 1. Pre-tax inojme of agent i in period 2 is
where e is an indicator fum^tion taking the value of I if tte agent invested in education, and 0 otherwise, and ^(ji) is miy monotonically increasing function of// widi ^0)^0.'* Therefore, 4>(M) represents the externality from the investn^nt in education by a nwasure fi of other agents on the productivity of eadi ^jent. Note that this externality occurs even if tise a^nt in question has not invited in education. For simplidty, from now on I will assume that ^(x) is the identity fuiu^tion ^(x)=^x. This externality drives the "trickle-down" property of the model, by which investment in education by one group may enable otter groiq)s to invest in education. In its absence, all the dynamics of the model would consist in a once-and-for-all investment by those groups whose pre-tax income exceeds 1, the cc»t of inv«itii^ in education. However, this is not the only type of externality that delivers the "trickle-down" feature of the mcMkl. For oample, if voting on die tax rate occurred in both periods, investment by one group couU be benefikdal to other groui» by increasii^ the resources avaHabte for redistribution m tiw future. ' There is no capittd market, no um^rtainty, no discounting. In period 1 the agents of this economy vote over the level of income taxes. Tjara are proportional to pre-tax iiKX>n». The reveniKS collected in this way are redistributol as a per capita subsidy, constant across individuals. The govemnKnt budget is always balaiK»d. However, there are convex costs in a>Ilecting tax^: thus, if ^ is the tax rate, tH is collected but only (t-t^)n can be redistributed to eadi individual.' Thus, no agent will ever vote for t> 2 because the sut»idy per capita is decaea^ng in t for t> j. Note that given tiiese assumptions a hi^ier proportional tax rate (in the range {0, s]) implies a more progressive tax-subsidy system. Utility is linear in consumption. L^ ci and ek rqtresent consumpticm in period 1 and 2 of an i^ent belongii^ to class i, respective, and kt n2 represent the pa capita inccnne in poiod 2. Overdl utility for an agent beicmging to group i is:
3. From now on, whenever a first period variable is coiisiderBd, the wbacrqM indicating the time period win be ooHtted tf no ambigwty can rendt. Thus, Ji stands fw iii, rf tor lif aad ao on.
4. HUB specification of the efficts of educatimi on euaing abHity is not an orthodox one in tbe human l literatiiie. A multiplicative rathnr tiM" an additive efiect is usnaOy assumed. An examfrie of a ptptt the additive effect spea6ea!6oa miapHed here k Chiswick (1971). 5. A OMidd baaed on ttis •'n^strftmtion cxtaroalily" was devriofwd in an eaffier venmi of this pqier, tA (1990).
6. WiOoBt convex costs of fioBtctaig tsxcs, it is a atantod mmit tbat, iriiea kiixHir is stiiamy. lA voters bdow tbe neaa pnfer fl wtdie aU w«m tbone HK neaa pnfar t^O. iBt a convex cost of collecting taxes aBows oae to avoid dwse i PEROTTI DBTiaBUTIONAND<aOWTH 759
It is dear that an a^it who takes as given the actions of the other agents would like to invest in education as long as i? ^ 1. In what follows, I will assume that this inequality is satis&d. TTiis effectively ensures that all agents would like to invest in education, indepen<^tly oi how many agents invest.Ĥ owever, giwn the a)»ence of capital maricets, agent i cumot invest in ediK:ation if n'il~t}+it-i^)ii< 1 (henceforth, the expression "agent /" will indicate an agent belonging to groiq> 0-Let n draote tlw pre-tax income of an agent whose after-tax inconw is exactly 1 at tlw tax rate t. Then «is defined implidtly by:
Thus, all agraits with pre-tax income n'<n cannot invest in ediuation at the tax rate t. n as a fiuK^on of t is deiacted in Figures l(a), (b) and (c), whkdi show that tlw function has very different qualitative bdiaviours depending on ^x^tb^ B > 4 (a "ridi" economy), 1<«<4 (an "intemwdiate bacome" economy), or n< 1 (a "poor economy"). Since the behaviour of the fumrtion n(0 is crucial for the results of the modd, it is important to obtain some intuition of its shape. Conader first a ridi economy. At each tax rate, a large amount of resources are redistributed. Thus, howwver poor an a^nt is, there will always be a tax rate t, /^|, sach that her post-tax it^xms enxeds 1. Wlaaper capita inconw is at an intermediate le^^l, there might be a situatimi «*ere an agmt's iwetax inconw is so small (n<n,»m in Figure l(b)) tlat no tax rate wiU raise her p<»t-tax income to 1 before tlw convexity of tlw cc^ of colict^mg taxes takra ovCT. Fiimlly, consoler a wy poor econony. If an agent ^arte with a pre-tax imxmw below 1, no tax rate wiD ewr oiaMe her to invest in educatitm: even in Ihe aksm* of costs i^collerting taxra she cmild reach at most a po^-tax iaetHne eqiol to B, viatM hkss than I. Moteawt, 1n rfaang the post-tax incoBW of a» iHjaats wito a ^w-tax income ^»ve n, in^ww »tob mkm hurts aO agmts with pre-tax iaoiHBe above I, and the more so tfe hi^mr is tlw tax rate. 
EXISTENCE OF A STABLE MAJORITY
In this Mctioa, I will {HOW that tbe oifidian vptor is tiie 6eawx voter mbea agen^ vote owQ" Ihe level ^the tax rate in the fir^ pmod.* I1» rrasoa why a whdb set^an is needbd to estj^i^ this tt^ilt is that, ^tac to ^ abaaSaaac oi dmeo^^oMes m tkc model, thoetoe the ui^ sitfcirat cosditicxrafor the be af^ed diicdiy. floiMewH', ance tiie may not h inq<xity the tepaataat this sectk^i witlKmt any inajxntant iatiiiticn <^ the
b WIH" it
Consider the problem solved by agent i in period 1. Her proposal will be:
Note that C2 depend on / for two reasons: first, the tax rate in period 1 detennirws whether agent 1 can invest in education; second, it determines how many agents invest in education, which affects the pre-tax income of agent 2 in the second period through the externality effect. Now consider the term argmax (•} in equation (4). Wherever «2 and n2 are differentiable with respect to <, this term is found by solving:'
(6) dt Ckarly, dnydt=O whenever this derivative exists. Therefore, over all the points where B2 is differentiabte with respect to t, the tax rate proposed by agent i will be i.e. in all points where B2 is differentiable, the optimal tax rate in period 1 for a^nt / is the tax rate that maximizes her post-tax income in the same period. Ho^wver, it is clear that there are several points of discontinuity of W2 as a function <^ t. The rrason is that, whowver tiw tax rate reach^ tiw level at which the post-tax iacams of agmt i is equal to I, all agmts in ^oup 1 invest in education, thereby increasing discretely thdr own pre-tax imxmw in period 2 and the inconw of ^1 other scents viâ otemality effect. The exact numbo* of points of discontinuity depends on tlw values <rf" n*, iT, «* and n. F%ure 2 Castrates tlw case of B>4, «"< 1, d< 1, i.e. tiw case with the laiqgKt nvsnAya <^ dracontmuities. h and f/ are the analler and largra* root oi ti^l~t)+it^i^)m-1 =8, wWte IM md im are ^fiiwd amilariy with tf rei^^^g B* in the iwcvious equation. In otl^^ words, as long as the tax mte is betweoi h and 4 agent / has eaeit^ I^e4ax iocsmxe to iavest in ediKsticHi, md similarty Sor agrot m. Proof. See Appendix A. || It can be shown that preferences in this model satisfy the condition of Order Restrictedness (see Rothstein (1989) ). In fact, with three proposals it can be shown that a necessary and sufficient condition for Result 1 to hold is that preferences be Order Restiicted. It is here that the importance of assuming a finite number of classes can be appreciated. In fact, tlw proof of Order Rratrictedness requires a finite number of altematives.
INCOME DISTRIBUTION, REDISTRIBUTION AND GROWTH
In this section I will invratigate how the initial distribution of income affects the degree of redistribution and, through this, the potentials for growth of an economy. The analysis of the jwevious section established that the median voter is the dedsive voter in all possible states: therefore, in what follows it is sufficient to analy» the optimal policies of the median voter in order to determine the equilibrium outconws.
The next two sub-sections consider the two cases of a rkh and a poor economy respectively. It wiU be shown that they have very different patterns of income distribution that are most favourabte to growth. The dynamic implications of this simpte fact will be more fiilly developed in Sections 5 and 6.
The cases of a rich and an intermediate income economy
Consider first an economy with a high per capita income, n ^ 4 (see Figure 1 (a) ). By Result A.2, tt,<h wlrai fl^ 1; this means that agent h can always iavtst in education at tlw tax rate that maximizes the median voter post-tax income in period 1. Thus, the only situation in whidi the median voter mi^t want to propose a tax rate diffraent from t% is whsai tm <ti, in which case agent / cannot invest in education at t*. because her post-tax inconw woidd be below 1 at t*. When t*<t, the median voter faces an intCTt«nporal trade-off. If she sets /=i, she loses something in the first period rdative to t=t*, but dearly will gam something in period 2, since B? increases if agent / invested in period 1. How the trade-off is resolved by the median voter has important implications for growth: if r=r;, high growtii win resuh. Otiwrwise, growth will be low. TTius, in or(ter to study tlw effects of iacotae distribution on growth one must analyze two qiwstions: (a) under what configurations of the relative shaies of the low-iiK»me and mi<kile-inconw groups will the nwdian voter face an int«temporal trade-off? (b) if there is indeed a trade-off, what configurations of iwxMBe will indiKe tlw mwlkn voter to set a high tax rate, so th^ Ow low-incrane p-oŵ ill inv«t and hi^ growth will cAtain? ... u Lrt J«<B",B') aad y(^,n') be the first-period Um and secc«^p«a«)d g^ijto m edian voter n^xwtiw^ frram setting tlw tax rate at f, instead trf ^. I^ zCw". Jf )-K'T'. H')-^rt",«') be flw owaaB gain (if positive) or loss (if o«^itive). Thrai, <iuestion (a) irijove keqaivak»t to fia^ ^diape ofthe x^^hxmm the (B*, B^^ace (see Figure  4 ) " Abwe tlm locus f^ is su«d«^ly dose to «" tJm 4^</ and the medi^ voter does i»t fece a cortKct b«we«ai the Omt ran and flw kmg ran. Below this locus there is indeed a cc^fet because 4<«^ Qacstion (b) Iheafore awre^xmds to finding the IOCIB Z-0 m W.
-0-4 aad REVIEW OF ECOMMIC STUDIO tl« region beloW the x=0 locus. Above the z=0 locus n' is sufikaently close to tT that the extra prc^r^avity of the tax ^ton reqiured to cosA^ the low-income group to invest is anaD comfMiied to the second-period gain; tiius, tlK m^ian voter wll s^ the tax rate at h and hig^ growth will follow. Below tlie z=0 locus z<0 and the median voter will set the tax rate at tt, so that low growth wiH obtain. The foQowing result formalizes this 2. For an eamemymth h'^A: ft tt tfiea iBtoitwe that tibe median v^er wffl fine two fdnn^ itoi^ons. tfxT is teife gi«« jf* (so th^ ^ is small) or «" is lugB gh>m 1^ (so tint 4 i> laifB) the «x»iioiii|r iml it-0-5 be in n^oo A in F^:uFe 6: lwre, tZ^h awl agents A wiD be able to invest in edtwation at the tax rate i»eferred by the nwdian vot(»^." In contrast, if n" is low given n* or n* is low givrai«", tb! economy wUl be in ie^<m B, wl^« t*>h. Now agents A will not be abk to an»nt m edtacaOxin at ^ and the ii»dian voter facn tiw familiar intotemporal Tte CHily diffnmiceis tiiat nam idw mu^ ttm^^s iiM&ttibution in p«iod 1 for a fm ca{^ inccfflie in period 2. QBC can tbi&eimt de&ae two tod x(if, i^^OaoA z{if, »i*>=0 in tlw («", «*) IB exact aaiAiggr to Ae case <tf a rk^ ec(m(»iy and^sed idiove. Thus, bdkm dw x== ag^ A offlmot ii»wst at C >i^fe bdow tl» z==Okx;iB tite flbort-pertod k^ to die nneduv oto'AosQ devia^ig fircMi tfw (^Mnsal tn rate outw^glu the 1<»^run pmdmyh^ tarn a ta^hor secrad'iierrad ^«r esc^fa iBC(»ae. It is ti^irfore natively easy to jpatove tfie folk>wing. 
ba:ame Quires, keels of mcfmm and growth
The modd devdoped so far delivers a ckar messi^: economies with different per-cainta iaamtes have very diffraent patterns of income distribution (i.e. relative shares) that are most favourabk to growth. In particular, income distribution affects growth through two in^. . . First, in a very poor economy growth can occur only if tlw distnbution of mcontt is sufl&^mtly unequal, so that ii*> 1. Similarly, in an intemwdiate income economy inconK distrilmtion determines whether thrae is a tax rate at which tte low-income group and the middte-inconw groiq) can invest in «iu«idon.
Second, mamx distribution affects the i»e-tax income of the nwdian voter relatioe to that of tlK group wht^e inwstment in edircation dqpeiKis on the tax rate («r in a poor economy, n' in a rich economy). This relative share in turn determines whether an intatemporal tnute-off exists and, when it exists, whether the median voter has an incaitive to set a tax system ihat jwomotes growtti.
In a rich and an intermediate income economy tte best preconditions for hi^ growth (in the soise that both groups / and m inwst) are a low slmre of group h and/or very similar shares of groups / and m (the region along the 45° line in Figures 4 and 5, assuming p'"=p'). When the share of the hi^-income group is relatively low, the two remamiiî lil hih t i When n' is close to H" ei p=p). When the share of the hi^income group is relatiey , ĝ roups will start with a relatively high pre-tax income. When n' is close to H", either tZ^ii or the median voter has relatively high incentives to let the low-ina)nM5 class invest through h^ redistribution.
• Figure 6 , if the share ofthe high-income group is very low, the economy wiQ be below the n* = 1 Hne, so that no tax rate w^allow agents h to invest Also, if n' is very close to ri" (along and close to the wita hiw 1 then the economy will be more likely to be in the region whwe z < 0, if it exists. The mtuition for this result is obvious: in a poor economy, not even a very progressive tax systan wifl allow low-income agents to invest, so that only h agents can potentially mvest Thus, any pattern of inccmie disteibution that endangers the investment abiHty of fla higji-monne agents can harm growth.
. / • • Exactly the opposite cot^guration of income distributionfavours high growth (i.e. investment by group h) in apoor economy with n<\. In

A NON-OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS MODEL WITH VOTING
In this section, I win develop an infinite-horizon, non-overlapping generations extemion of the two-period model of Sections 3 and 4. This is necessary to study the effects of the mechanism analyzed so far on the dynamic path of the economy. Indeed, by considcnng an explicitly dynamic economy, this section has three main objectives: (l) to formahze a process of growth, implicit in the two-period model, whereby a group investing m education increases the future income of afl groups and therefore may enable the groups further down the ladder to invest in education as well; (ii) to analyse the degree of persistence m the evolution of the economy stemming from the initial pattern of mcome distributitm; This specification has the wry usdful imfdication that tte indirect lifetin^ utility is again linear in e. Indeed, it is easy to ^ow tfiat b',.^2 is proportional to the iiKX>me of agent (in genoiation s wbea old: Ai+2=(l-y)(«'+ite+A*»«)-
Tlierefore, tte indirect utility of agent i as a ftuiction of / is:'.
Since p^j, now R^2 is a necessary condition for aa agoit to be willing to invest in educaticHi whraevra-bet post-tax iiKxnne ecceeds 1. Jhaeioa, frmn now <Hi M^2 win be assumed. Given tiMse hypotheses, ihe in&ute-lK>rizon HHktel k e^eaitiaBy a sequraoe <d two^JOiiod mo6i^ vilk son» minor mo^c&^ms due to the pttaeace <^ beqaesis (see Aj^iendix C for <fetaik). However, by foQowing die econmny over toon than two pariods, it m now po^iUe to analyze aU the imf^katicHis erf" die strong into the two-perkxl OKXM. In fiKt, Section 4 ^owed that high is assodi^ed with dffi^mt iMUtians <^ iu^me <&ttil»tfi«»i in eocmmaes witĥ tiSeamt per apita incomes. In an in&ute-hc^izim vnskm, diis ptoperty of the modd has Essentially, a given pattem of inc(»ae distn3Hiti<m can be extrm^y iqjfHoprkte for growtb at aceitain levd <rf'income; once the ec(»omy has readied a hi^jwr levd (^incoDoe, thai same pattern of income distribution might hamper or, in extreme cases, b so because i»e-tax inccHne distribution is essentially a state variaUe, aad ia^iiy dep^lmt on initial conditions. Also, the feasibility of changing the post-tax dqiends tm the characteristics of the political equiHlHiiBn resulting the pi^toti (rf' pn-tax income distributicm. Thin, im JDBqwrtant diaractaistic of the modd is that the steady-state reached by tiie ttooaamy a 1^8^ senative to the initial di^rilmtiim of infoome. In partkiilar, an eocMiomy Auts out at a very kw ievd of income (ii(2-y) < 1) witii very hi^ VRhies of i/" ccrtwnJy satisfies the preconditions for growth at that tevel of income, as described in Section 4, aiwl theaioTe can move to the next level of inaane (1 <n,(2-y)<4). Omx ase, howevet, hi# growth can occur only with a very difFerent conjuration of inconK disteibution. As a consequence, after an initial spurt of high growth a very unequal society mi^t get stask at a relatively low level of inconre with MI ewn worse mcome distnbution than the initial O1M.
This mechanism may be potentially relevant in connection with tlw long-standing debate on tte existence of an inverted-U relation between inequality and per capita mcome. EmpiricaUy this relation seems to be quite robust in cross-section studies, and has been consistently obtained for more than three decades." However, time-senes studies tend to cast doubts on the shape of the relation." Essentially, the growth process seems to be consistent with a wide variety of behaviours of income distribution measures over tin». The path-dependence displayed by the overlapping-generations model of this section might explain these empirical regularities. The point is best made by way of an example (Zmeadix C generalizes the result to a certain extent). It is assumed here thatp =/> -/=^=| and ^=2. Abo, «'=«" only for simplidty. Consider now three economies. A, B and' C with the same initial per capita income in period 1 ii, = 0-82, so that nz=HI (2 y)-0-98 Imt with very different patterns of income distribution, as specified m the tables bdo^. Letting j indicate the time period, the evolution of average income and mcome distribution in each economy is as follows:
Country A /=1 n,=0 82 «'=0 82 n"=0 82 n*=0 82 .= 2 /i,(2-y)=098 «'(2-y)=098 /r(2-r)=098 «*(2-y)=098
"00 y5 «52 Note that necessarily all these countries readi a steady-state at most in period^, where a steady state is dinned as a situation in which the economy repeats itself every twô Now tet Sf be the rf«re in total income of group * in I^«»/ms « a mT iBWrtrfU friatioa la 17. See e^»««May Fid<&-**rf>«m (1990).
REVIEW OF ECO1>K)MIC STUDIK
i Economy B is only sl^iitly nrore ii^^tarimi: Sf=0-35. Finally, eccnicHny C B aK:teri3»d by a very ui^ual iiwon» ^tribution: 5t= 1. As shown abew, ecc»omy A cannot grow; between B and C, B is deuiy worse equiiqied for initial p'owth: in fact, it tarely siKxeeds in starting &e devdopmott {HOC^. Howevra-, omse the growth inocess has started, B is in a better posaticm to continue grow& than C. Incteed, in the seccmd period C rrach^ a steady-state where only th« high income class is inviting ui education, and therefore in«>me distribution B evoi more unequal than initially. By contrast, economy B reaclKS the steady state in the third perkni, wiih ^ da^ investing. Thus, ii»x>me distributk>n has imj^oved afto-ths first ima:ease in ii^quaUty and steady-state income is higlwr than C's st«idy-state incxHne.
Now suiqjose an econometrkaan obsoi^ ttese econonoes aft» th^ have reached their steady-statra'* and trira to fit the brat curve in tlw (S*, H) space: such a curve wilt be m iKoerted-U (see Figure 7) . The reason is simpte: tlK econiHnws that in steady-state have a higher income Ievd are those wh(»e initial inanne distribution enabled tiwm to deal best with the difforrat phas« of economk develojaiunt. In very egaUtariim economies, like A, no invKtmoit in hranan ciq}ital coukl evo* tate place. In econcnnies with a wry unequal income distributk>n, like C, the middle and/OT the lower class are so poor that not even the maximum feasil^ tevel of redistribution wiU enable them to inwst in ediKation. Ctaly economkis that started out su&amtly equal, but not exc^sively so, have the ability both to start growth and to keep Rowing once an intomediate Ievd of inccnne is reached.
Note however that the tiims-series behaviour of S* presents an inverted-U pattem only in the case of economy B, while in country C it only increases and in country A it never moves. This Mems to be cmisistoit with tte available onpirical evidence in two respects. First, as mentioned above, tte time-series behaviour of inequality measure is known to follow a variety of pattems. Second, the presence of an inverted-U pattem in tioK sanes has berai doounented quite (K^nvincin^ for several currratty industrisJized countries, including U.S., Great Britain, Germany, Norway, I>enmark, the Netlwriands," white h^ and imnxamg levels of inequality are more ccnnmon among intermediate iocome economies.
Tlw non-ovralappng gawrations model also sheds further light on the "trkdde down" process of growth that is only implicit in tiie two-paiod model. By increasing the prodiwtivity of ail income ^oui«, inv^tment by the uf^r class in the first period might allow the other classes to invest in the following period. A comparison of economies B and C reveals what is a precondition for this "trickle-down" medianism to operate: tlw pre-tax income rf the groups that rely oa this mechanian should be above a certain threshold level, below whkh there is no level of redistribution that allow investment in ediK:ation. Similarly, un<ter some circumstance investment in education by tiie middte class will enaUe the lowinccHne group to invest in the next period.
This also illustrates the crucial role played by political factors in the ^owth process. Essentially, the political outcome resulting from a given income distribution determines whether the intertemporal transmission of the externality outlined above goes on until all classes have invested or it stops before this occurs.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
An important assumption of the model is that taxes are linear and revenues are rebated to individuals in a lump-sum fashion. The reason for this assumption is exclusively one of analytical tractability: it is weU known that with non-linear taxes the existence of a noncycling majority may fail. Notice, however, that if one introduced two ideologically committed parties it mi^t be possible to have a stable majority with non-linear taxes. In such a atuation one could «plore the interesting possibility that, in the political equilibrium, the hi^-inconw class is made to pay ahnost all the costs of investment in alucation by the other dasses.
More generally, the tax-subsidy scheme assumed in the model implies that it is not possibte to sut^idize the middle class without subsidizing the poor as wefl. Although this is a long-standing and unresolved issue, many researchers have argued that the middle dass captures a disproiwrtionate part of the benefits of govemment ejqxnditure. A^in, this important aspect cannot be captured in this model. However, the essence of this paper is tiiat wtei growth k associated with redistribution, tlw benefits spin over to some extent to the poor; when the spillover is substantial, this enables the poor to qualitatiwiy change their iKittem of education. In this sense, the assumption on the distribution of benefits in this paper plays an important role in proving tlw existence of a political equilibrium, but is not strktly neceraary for tlw economics of the model.
ITw mocW also a«unws that the benefits of investinent in education by the poor are captured by all dara«. Chw mi^t argiw that the rkh benefit the most from a better educat^i work force, saiKX in geiwtal it is tfw rk* w*o hire labour. In tiiiis (a% tlwre would be two ^ects, wOTking m opptmte directions, on tlw d<^w of pro^^ivity iM-rferred by tlw lugh-income c^s. If the efflect just described preyaib, one would observe both the rich ai^ the poor vote for h^ ledi^bution. Apin, it is not cksar whetlwr a non-cyding majority woi^ eust.
REVIEW OF ECXJNOMIC STUDIES
Anotl^r situation in whidi both the ridi aiKi the poor might vote ^ similar amounts of redistrilmtion arises when oae ctKimcteis the posnlrility (^ publkdy-provided education. This is a case in which possibly titte rkh and the poor wiO vote for a bnv amount of redistribution, the formCT because tteir tax price is higtwr, the lattra* because, with «K>U0I curvature in the utility function, the opportumty cost of going to school may be extrsnely high at low levels of iircome. Fernanda and Rogerson ( fgrow at an. it m^ be the «« that Rrf to 1. Tim invlies «(2-r)//>l. f^ in tmn tir««Soo is aot l^ for tte p«Mrfof part (i) of Result Cl.
